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NOTE
TRIX ARE NOT JUST FOR KIDS:
THE SUPREME COURT'S CLUMSY HANDLING
OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION
AND ITS LEGISLATIVE IMPACT
ON BREAKFAST AND BEYOND
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Silly Rabbit, Trix are for kids." 1 It is more than just a slogan:
General Mills believes it is constitutionally protected speech under the
First Amendment. 2 But if Trix are for kids, recent Supreme Court
decisions granting expansive constitutional protections to corporations
are for adults.3 As a result, General Mills's claim is less absurd than it
would have seemed a generation ago. These decisions will continue to
distort First Amendment doctrine in this fashion unless legislators and
the Supreme Court embrace an understanding of the public-private
4
distinction that better reflects the values of the U.S. Constitution.
Anxiety about corporate power is more than an academic or policy
issue. The tensions between government, corporations, and individual
1. Trix, GENERAL MILLS, http://www.generalmills.com/en/Brands/Cereals/Trix.aspx (last
visited Nov. 5, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Martin H. Redish, Childhood Obesity, Advertising and the First Amendment 1 (June 8,
2011) (unpublished White Paper), available at http://www.gmaonline.org/file-manager/
HealthNutrition/childhoodadvertisingfirstamendment.pdf (writing on General Mills's behalf in
response to a solicitation from the Interagency Working Group on Food Marketed to Children
regarding their proposal for restrictions on food advertising to children).
3. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1748, 1751 (2011) (arguing
that the efficiency interests of arbitration controlled); Fed. Commc'n Comm'n v. AT&T Inc., 131 S.
Ct. 1177, 1182-83 (2011) (distinguishing between "person," which applies to natural persons and
corporations, and "personal," which only applies to natural persons (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (overruling Austin
v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), and "retum[ing] to the principle
established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may not suppress political speech on the
basis of the speaker's corporate identity").
4. See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, How Does the Government Interact with Business?: From History
to Controversies, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 707, 729 (2010) (suggesting a constitutional
amendment explicitly precluding corporations from constitutional protection).
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citizens have made their way into pop culture too, from the
megacorporations in William Gibson's Neuromancer5 to the extensive
reach of the Umbrella Corporation in the Resident Evil franchise. 6 Such
scenarios are not limited to fantasy, either.7 Carnegie Steel hired the
Pinkerton National Detective Agency to send 300 armed men to break
up a union strike at the Homestead Steel Works in 1892.8 Today,
corporations employ more than just private security forces: companies in
New York City hired off-duty police officers to exercise police power
against "Occupy Wall Street" protesters last fall. 9
Part II of this Note details how the Supreme Court granted
constitutional rights to corporations over a series of landmark cases. It
describes four different ways to draw the public-private distinction in
order to better understand the Court's reasoning. Part III examines recent
decisions that have either extended or solidified constitutional
protections for corporations against the citizenry. The decisions are
rooted in a tradition that places corporations on the same side of the
public-private divide as individuals, and this tradition is shaping future
legislation, such as the Interagency Working Group on Food Marketed to
Children's proposed guidelines concerning the advertising of food to
children. Part IV re-examines these cases through the lens of the
traditional liberal democratic understanding of the public-private

5. WILLIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1984). Megacorporations are massive conglomerates
that have their own private armies. See generally id. Vincenzo Natali will direct a forthcoming film
adaptation. Matt Goldberg, Vincenzo Natali's Adaptation of Neuromancer Moves into PreProduction with Eye Towards Q1 2012 Start Date, COLLIDER (May 19, 2011, 2:07 PM),
http://www.collider.com/neuromancer-movie-vincenzo-natali-pre-production/91780/.
6. RESIDENT EVIL: APOCALYPSE (Constantin Film 2004). In the film, the Umbrella
Corporation exercised state power by shutting down bridges to and from Racoon City, deploying
and directing police forces, wielding military power by dropping a nuclear warhead on the city, and
exerting draconian control over the press by whitewashing the zombie disaster and reframing it as a
meltdown of the nuclear plant. Id. The Resident Evil franchise consists of twenty video games, five
live-action films, and numerous licensed consumer products. Media from Resident Evil (2002),
INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://wwwimdb.com/find?s=all&q=resident+evil (last visited Nov.
5, 2012); Resident Evil, WKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ResidentEvil (last visited
Nov. 5, 2012).
7. See generally PAUL KRAUSE, THE BATTLE FOR HOMESTEAD, 1880-1892: POLITICS,
CULTURE, AND STEEL (1992) (discussing the Homestead Strike in which Carnegie Steel hired a
private army to remove union steelworkers).
8. Id. at 15; see also HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492PRESENT 276-77 (HarperCollins 2005) (1980). Before landing, Pinkerton's Captain Heinde
announced from his river barge: "We don't wish to shed blood, but we are determined to go up there
and shall do so. If you men don't withdraw, we will mow every one of you down and enter in spite
of you." KRAUSE, supra note 7, at 18.
9. Pam Martens, Financial Giants Put New York City Cops on Their Payroll,
COUNTERPUNCH (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.counterpunch.org/2011/10/10/financial-giants-putnew-york-city-cops-on-their-payroll/.
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distinction and proposes that this framework better preserves the
democratic values that shaped our Constitution. Finally, Part V
concludes.
II.

HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION

A line of cases have granted a series of constitutional rights to
corporations. 1' From Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward" and
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific RailroadCo. 12 to FirstNational
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,13 the Court has been consistent about one
thing: expanding the rights of corporate entities.14 Far from providing
liberty against the hand of government power, decisions like Santa Clara
needlessly constrained regulation and elevated the rights of "fictional"
persons above real individuals. t5 This expansionist agenda dismissed
traditional democratic ideology. 16 By focusing on features of corporate
power, as distinguished from government power, the Supreme Court
aligned corporate entities closer to natural persons. 17 It looked at identity
rather than power. 18 But protections for natural persons against
aggregation of power is a central concern of traditional democratic
theorists. 19 Section A looks at several key historical cases that expand
10. See Carl J. Mayer, Personalizingthe Impersonal: Corporationsand the Bill of Rights, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 577, 581-82, 664-65 app. I (1990) (listing a "Corporation's Bill of Rights").
11. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 634, 647-48 (1819) (reading corporations into the Constitution by
virtue of the Contracts Clause in Article I protecting corporate charters); see also U.S. CONST. art I,
§ 10, cl. 1.
12. 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (granting corporations Due Process and Equal Protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment by reading "person" to include corporations).
13. 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978) (holding that a Massachusetts law restricting corporate election
spending violated the Constitution); see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why
Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1017 (1998) [hereinafter Greenwood,
Essential Speech]; Mark Tushnet, Corporationsand Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 253, 256 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
14. See Mayer, supranote 10, at 664-65 app. I.
15. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 33 (2006) ("The 'corporatelaw-as-private-law' assumption subtly and unnecessarily restricts the range of options available to
those who search for mechanisms to regulate corporations."); Mayer, supra note 10, at 658
("Equality of constitutional rights plus an inequality of legislated and de facto powers leads
inexorably to the supremacy of artificial over real persons.").
16. See Mayer, supranote 10, at 664-65 app. I.
17. See, e.g., Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396.
18. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 902-03 (2010) (addressing the
Bellotti Court's holding that legislators may not restrict speech based on the identity of the speaker);
see Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396. Part IILA, infra, explores the issue of identity in more depth,
particularly as it relates to modem cases such as Citizens United.
19. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 35 (James W.
Ellington trans., Hacket Publ'g 3d ed. 1993) (1785) ("Now I say that man, and in general every
rational being, exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or
that will."); JoHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 3-4 (C. B. Macpherson ed.,
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protection of corporate rights under the Constitution. Section B contrasts
the modem corporate form with its historical antecedent and discusses
how traditional liberal democratic theorists approach issues of political
rights and power. Section C introduces four different ways to draw the
public-private distinction in order to provide a foundation to analyze
recent Supreme Court decisions and upcoming legislation in Part III.
A.

Expanding CorporateProtection Under the Constitution

The Supreme Court used Dartmouth College to begin to free
corporations from legislative control with the "novel" approach of
allowing corporations to have a private status. 20 The Court distinguished
Dartmouth College from a municipality-both corporations. 2 1 This
distinction was crucial. 2 Municipal corporations, said the Court, derived
from sovereign authority; Dartmouth did not.23 Municipal corporations
fulfilled government functions; Dartmouth did not.24 This distinction
would later cast its shadow over the state action cases.25 The decision
calibrated a new line in the public-private divide.26 The Court's purpose,
Professor Morton Horwitz wrote, was "to free the newly emerging
Hackett Publ'g 1980) (1690) ("T[o] understand political power right, and derive it from its original,
we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state ofperfectfreedom to order
their actions...."); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ'g
1978) (1859) (distinguishing individuals from all other powers that may threaten them); JEANJACQUES ROUSSEAU, On the Social Contract, in BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS 139, 141 (Donald A.

Cress ed. & trans., Hackett Publ'g 1987) (1762) ("Man is born free, and everywhere he is in
chains.").
20. Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1423, 1425 (1982) [hereinafter Horwitz, The History of the Public/PrivateDistinction] (discussing
the rise of the public-private distinction from the English monarchy through the post-World War II
period); see also Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 609, 647 (1819);
Henry J. Friendly, The Public-PrivatePenumbra-FourteenYears Later, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289,
1290 (1982) (proposing that the public function doctrine originated in Dartmouth College where the
Court decided that the college trustees did not fulfill any duty that "flow[ed] from" government
power (quoting Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 634) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
21. Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 634, 647 (1819); Friendly, supra note 20, at 1290
("Dartmouth, Chief Justice Marshall explained, was not like a municipal corporation, the charter of
which the legislature could amend at will.").
22. See Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 634; Friendly, supranote 20, at 1290.
23. Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 634, 647; see Friendly, supra note 20, at 1290.
24. Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 647 (holding that Dartmouth did not "fill the
place, which would otherwise be occupied by government, but that which would otherwise remain
vacant"); see Friendly, supra note 20, at 1290.
25. See Friendly, supra note 20, at 1290. Chief Justice Thurgood Marshall looked at whether
Dartmouth trustees and officers performed any duty ordinarily performed by the government, and
Friendly argues that this is the precursor to the public function doctrine "developed in the context of
the contracts clause rather than of 'state action."' Id.
26. Horwitz, The History of the Public/PrivateDistinction,supra note 20, at 1425 (describing
contemporaneous efforts to privatize corporations).
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business corporation from the regulatory
public law premises that had
'27
dominated the prior law of corporations.
The Supreme Court in Santa Clara widened the umbrella of
Fourteenth Amendment protection to include corporations.2 8 It did so
dogmatically, declaring that corporations were "persons" for some
sections of the Fourteenth Amendment by judicial fiat, with no
explanation or argument.2 9 Chief Justice Morrison Waite told the
attorneys:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which
forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws,
applies to these corporations. We are all of the
30
opinion that is does.
While Santa Clara ushered in a number of similar cases that
established corporate protection under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses, it contributed to narrowing the
Amendment to avoid its intended purpose of protecting former slaves
from takings of life, liberty, and property by states.3" In fact, in the halfcentury following Santa Clara,the Fourteenth Amendment was used on
behalf of corporations (as opposed to African-Americans) by a ratio of
more than a hundred to one.32
In a withering dissent in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander,33 Justice
William Douglas attacked Santa Clara's "distortion" of the Fourteenth
Amendment and addressed both the meaning and intention of the
original text.34 Justice Douglas reminded the Court that the "evil to be
27. Id. (continuing that "municipal and trading corporations ...were regarded as arms of the
state").
28. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
29. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 67 (1992) [hereinafter HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW]; Tushnet, supra note 13, at 255-56 (internal quotation marks omitted); Mayer,
supra note 10, at 581 (interpreting the Court as decreeing "that a corporation is a person for
purposes of the fourteenth amendment").
30. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (referring to Chief Justice Waite's speech in Santa Clara). The
Santa Clara Court did not include his words in their opinion, and the opinion did not address the
issue at all. Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396.
31. Mayer, supra note 10, at 589; see also Wheeling, 337 U.S. at 576-77 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("(T]he purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment was to protect human rights-primarily
the rights of a race which had just won its freedom.").
32. See Mayer, supra note 10, at 589; THE CORPORATION (Big Picture Media Corporation
2003) (reporting that between 1890 and 1910, of the 307 cases brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 288 were brought by corporations and only nineteen by African-Americans).
33. 337 U.S. 562.
34. Id. at 576-81 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing the semantic and historical context of
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remedied" by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection
Clause was a human rights issue. 5 Congress never intended it to shield
corporations.36 Justice Douglas hashed through each phrase in the
amendment: "corporations are not 'born or naturalized.' Corporations
are not 'citizens' . . . . It has never been held that they are persons whom
a State may not deprive of 'life.' 37 The Fourteenth Amendment applies
to "natural and not artificial persons. 38 Santa Clara represents a
significant expansion of corporate power by aggressive constitutional
interpretation with little basis in the text, structure, history, or intent of
the Amendment.39
Lochner v. New York4" declared that corporations and other
employers had the right to challenge legislative regulation of workplace
health and safety as violations of the employees' constitutional right to
41
Due Process. Justice Rufus Peckham's decision effectively struck
down as unconstitutional the New York Bakeshop Act of 1895, which42
limited the number of hours a baker could work for his employer.
Because the statute "interfere[d] with the right of contract," it
"deprive[d] [a] person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law," in accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment.43 This
sanctification of supposedly private contracts provided corporations with
a "powerful wedge" to use to challenge government regulation. 44 The
the Fourteenth Amendment).
'The
35. Id. at 577 ("[T]he purpose of the Amendment was to protect human rights .
existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated
with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied... ."
(quoting Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 86 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
people were not told that the states of the South were to be denied their normal relationship with the
Federal Government unless they ratified an amendment granting new and revolutionary rights to
corporations."); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873)).
36. Wheeling, 337 U.S. at 578 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Arthur Twining Hadley that,
"It is doubtful whether a single one of the members of Congress who voted for it had any idea that it
would touch the question of corporate regulation at all." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Conn.
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 303 U.S. at 86 (Black, J., dissenting) ("The records of the time can be searched in
vain for evidence that this amendment was adopted for the benefit of corporations.").
37. Wheeling, 337 U.S. at 579 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
38. Id. (quoting Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67, 68 (C.C. D. La. 1870)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
39. Id. at 581 ("It may be most desirable to give corporations this protection from the
operation of the legislative process. But that question is not for us. It is for the people.").
40. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
41. Id. at 53 (finding that government regulation violated a corporation's Due Process under
the Fourteenth Amendment).
42. Id.; Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York: Tradition or Change in Constitutional Law?,
I N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 404,408 (2005) (noting that the legislature passed the law unanimously).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (finding that government
regulation violated a corporation's Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment).
44. See Mayer, supra note 10, at 588; see also GREENFIELD, supranote 15, at 30 (proposing
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Lochner Court viewed employment contracts as divorced from politics
and the contractual relationship between employer and employee as a
neutral negotiation between parties of equal bargaining power.45 Fear of
labor's influence on the use of legislative power to weaken the forces
that protected wealth also shaped the Court's decision.46 When labor
"turn[ed] to government for help" against "concentrated corporate
47
power," Lochner-eradoctrine viewed corporations as "the oppressed.
Bellotti extended freedom of speech to corporations. 48 A
Massachusetts statute prohibited banks and other corporations from
contributing to election referenda beyond those which directly affected
the corporations themselves. 49 Rather than proving a positive, namely
that corporations have protection under the First Amendment, the Court
focused on the lack of a negative, that the appellee had not shown that
corporate political speech undermined speech of private citizens.5 °
Although the Court assumed, rightly, that "[i]f the speakers here were
not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence their
proposed speech,",51 it assumed, incorrectly, that a corporation's political
speech was taken for granted and required a proof against the weight of
its influence. 52 The decision flatly ignores the effect on individual
speech, which 5 3subsequently suffers the risk of corporate speech
drowning it out.

that Lochner's echoes resonate even today).
45. See GREENFIELD, supra note 15, at 34-36 ("Contract and property law are no more
neutral, private, or prelegal than statutory law."). But see generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era
Revisionism, Revised Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO.
L.J. 1 (2003) (challenging the notion that Lochner was an exercise in class legislation).
46. See Kens, supra note 42, at 417-18 (looking at the Court's concern for business interests
during the Lochner era).
47. Seeid. at418.
48. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978) (holding that a
Massachusetts law restricting corporate spending on elections violated the Constitution); Tushnet,
supra note 13, at 256; Greenwood, Essential Speech, supra note 13, at 1017.
49. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767-68.
50. See id at 789 ("If appellee's arguments were supported by record or legislative findings
that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes, thereby
denigrating rather than serving First Amendment interests, these arguments would merit our

consideration.").
51. Id. at 777.
52. See id at 789 ("[T]here has been no showing that the relative voice of corporations has
been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts ....); Mayer,
supra note 10, at 653 ("[T]he decision ignores the political power of corporations to wield undue
influence on referend[a] ...[and] ... that corporate contributions might lower the usefulness, while
raising the volume, of the debate.").
53. See Mayer, supra note 10, at 658 ("The corporate exercise of [F]irst [A]mendment rights
frustrates the individual's right to participate equally in democratic elections ....
");see also
HARLAN ELLISON, The Deathbird, in DEATHBIRD STORIEs 302, 302 (1975) ("Provisos of equal time

are not served by one viewpoint having media access to two hundred million people in prime time
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B. TraditionalLiberal DemocraticTheorists on Power
Modem corporations do not share the same limitations early
corporations did.5 4 Two hundred years ago, many corporations had
limited lifespans, they could not own stock of other corporations, they
could not merge or operate in states other than the one that chartered
them, they could not spend money on elections, and states granted them
limited charters.55 The ultra vires doctrine, now virtually extinct, barred
them from doing anything outside of the purposes (often quite narrow)
specified in their state-granted charter.56 This has all changed.57
Modem corporations did not exist at the time traditional democratic
theorists were writing.58 They do, however, have similar features to
entities that did exist at that time: governments. 59 Traditional liberal
democratic theorists focused on how to protect the natural rights of
citizens from governmental power. 60 For John Locke and Jean-Jacques
while opposing viewpoints are provided with a soapbox on the comer."); OWEN M. FiSS, THE IRONY
OF FREE SPEECH 59 (1996) ("[E]conomics, not technology, [is] the constraining force on the press.
The technological revolution ... may present us with a large number of channels, but as long as
they are governed by the market, there remains a risk that coverage will be skewed.").
54. THE CORPORATION, supra note 32 (tracing the history of modem corporate personhood).
55. Our Hidden History of Corporations in the United States, RECLAIM DEMOCRACY (Feb.
2000), http://reclaimdemocracy.org/corporate accountability/historycorporations-us.html (looking
at the change in the form of corporations throughout the life of the United States).
56. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of CorporateTheory, 88 W.
VA. L. REV. 173, 188 (1985) [hereinafter Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited]; THE CORPORATION,
supra note 32 (explaining that at least some state-granted charters included a mandate to serve the
public good).
57. Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate
ConstitutionalRights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 910-11 (2011); Our Hidden History of Corporations
in the UnitedStates, supra note 55; THE CORPORATION, supra note 32.
58. Locke and Rousseau wrote in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, respectively. See,
e.g., LOCKE, supra note 19; ROUSSEAU, supra note 19. The cases in this Note all take place after
their writings. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); Trs. of
Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). The modem corporation dates to the
great reform in corporate law at the beginning of the twentieth century. See LINCOLN STEFFENS,
THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 209-10 (Joseph J. Kwiat ed., Johnson Reprint Corp. 1968)
(1906); Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited, supranote 56, at 195.
59. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, FCC v. AT&T: The Idolatry of Corporationsand Impersonal
Privacy,HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. n.53 (Aug. 14, 2011), http://hlpronline.com/2011/08/fcc-v-att-the[hereinafter Greenwood, The Idolatry of
idolatry-of-corporations-and-impersonal-privacy/
Corporations] ("Our major business corporations belong on the state side of the classic liberal
divide between state and citizen: like the state, they are governance institutions on which we depend
but which always threaten to escape our control."); see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond the
Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty: JudicialDecision-Making in a Polynomic World, 53 RUTGERS L.
REV. 781, 861 (2001) [hereinafter Greenwood, Beyond the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty]
(discussing the shift of "boundaries between state and society, politics and market"); Miller, supra
note 57, at 891 ("Business corporations in particular possess a degree of coercive power equal to,
and occasionally greater than, that of government.").
60. See KANT, supra note 19, at 35 ("Now I say that man, and in general every rational being,
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Rousseau, the purpose of government was to secure the natural rights of
its citizens. 61 The purpose of all other "associations" was to improve the
welfare of human beings.62 Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill argued
opposite approaches to the problem (deontological and utilitarian,
respectively), yet they achieved substantively similar results.63 For Mill,
people created organizations to serve their interests, not the
organizations' .64 For Kant, people were ends and should not be treated as
a means to an end.65
Protecting the natural rights of natural persons meant protecting
them from power centers.66 Corporations or associations of people were
not identified as structures in need of protection. 67 As functions of the
actions of natural persons, they were subservient to the rights of natural
persons. 6 Power, not identity, was the issue. 69 It so happened that power
in the time the traditional liberal democratic theorists were writing was
concentrated in government entities, but that is a feature of history, not
of the theories themselves.7 °
C. The Four Public-PrivateDistinctions
Semantic frameworks determine how we define words and how we
draw distinctions, such as the public-private distinction. 7 1 A semantic
exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will.");
LOCKE, supra note 19, at §§ 3-4 ("T[o] understand political power right, and derive it from its
original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state ofperfect freedom
to order their actions."); MILL, supra note 19, at 9 (distinguishing individuals from all other powers
that may threaten them); ROUSSEAU, supra note 19, at 141 ("Man is born free, and everywhere he is
in chains.").
61. See LOCKE, supra note 19, at §§ 3-4; ROUSSEAU, supra note 19, at 141.
62.

See ROUSSEAU, supra note 19, at 148; cf THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2

(U.S. 1776) (explaining that "governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed," and in order to secure their rights of "life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness," people may "alter or... abolish" this institution).
63. Compare LOCKE, supra note 19, at §§ 3-4, and ROUSSEAU, supra note 19, at 141, with
KANT, supranote 19, at 35, and MILL, supra note 19, at 9.
64. See MILL, supra note 19, at 9.
65.

KANT, supra note 19, at 35; see also JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 256 (1971)

(saying that a person should act according to her "nature as a free and equal rational being").
66. See KANT, supranote 19, at 35; LOCKE, supra note 19, at §§ 3-4; MILL, supra note 19, at
9; ROUSSEAU, supra note 19, at 141.
67. See ROUSSEAU, supra note 19, at 148 (writing about associations of people sharply
distinguished from individual citizens).
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See KANT, supra note 19, at 35; LOCKE, supra note 19, at §§ 3-4; MILL, supra note 19, at
9; ROUSSEAU, supra note 19, at 141.
71. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Linguistics as a Knowledge Domain in the Law, 54 DRAKE L.
REv. 651, 653-54 (2006) (providing a brief background about linguistics as the field relates to law).
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framework simply describes the relationship between the words we use
and their meaning. Choosing amongst semantic frameworks yields
different truths in relation to that framework.73 The framework at issue in
this Note is the public-private distinction, the ways to demarcate it, and,
subsequently, where the Supreme Court and our legislative branch have
placed corporations and citizens. There are four ways to draw the publicprivate distinction.7 4
The Santa Clara view is that governments are public, but
corporations and individuals are private and, as such, receive protections
against the exercise of government power under the Constitution. 5
While Santa Clara harkens back to the nineteenth century and its views
almost certainly would not have been shared by Locke or Rousseau in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it endures today in cases like
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission76 and AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion.77 The Court refused to even hear whether or not
corporations were persons under the Fourteenth Amendment.78 No
matter that the Court read them as persons under the first clause but not

72. See id. at 653.
73. See C. Edwin Baker, Posner's Privacy Mystery and the Failure of Economic Analysis of
Law, 12 GA. L. REV. 475, 489, 494 (1978) (positing that our choice of legal rules requires us to look
at what kind of structure people want in the future); Miller, supra note 57, at 915 ("Whether a
corporation enjoys some, none, or all of the benefits of a constitutional right depends in large part on
the theoretical assumptions the Court makes about corporate personality."). Because previous
decisions dictate the Court's theoretical assumptions about corporations, Miller continues, "[o]nce a
corporation is deemed a person for one right, reason demands an explanation why it is not a person
for another." Id.
74. See United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 334, 343-44 (2007) (holding that corporations were public where they filled a role vacated by
the government); Daniela Gobetti, Humankind as a System. Private and Public Agency at the
Origins of Modern Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES

ON A GRAND DICHOTOMY 103, 103 (Jeff Weintraub & Krishan Kumar eds., 1997) (discussing the
formulation of citizens as private contrasted to the institutional body as public, especially as
elaborated upon by modem British thinkers); Frank I. Goodman, ProfessorBrest on State Action
and Liberal Theory, and a Postscript to ProfessorStone, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1331, 1344, 1347
(1982) (arguing that the nature of private enterprise to act for itself distinguishes it from the public
sphere). See generally Paul M. Schoenhard, A Three-DimensionalApproach to the Public-Private
Distinction, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 635 (raising difficulties with the traditional binary way of looking
at the public-private distinction and proposing a multi-dimensional approach).
75. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886); see Goodman, supra note 74,
at 1344, 1347 (arguing that the nature of private enterprise to act for itself distinguishes it from the
public sphere).
76. 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
77. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747-48 (2011) (ignoring the disparity in bargaining power between
corporations and individuals).
78. Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396; see HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
supra note 29, at 67; Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited, supra note 56, at 173-74; Mayer, supra note
10, at 581; Tushnet, supra note 13, at 256.
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under the second. 79 Santa Clara classified state-chartered institutions
alongside natural persons as private entities deserving protection against
the government.8 °
Under the situational view, governments are public, individuals are
private, and corporations are private in some situations and public in
others.8 1 Proponents of this view suggest that there are social spaces that
are "neither fully public nor fully private., 82 The public and private sides
of the dichotomy remain, but rather than a line splitting them, there is a
region of networks or communities that share aspects of one or both of
the public and private sides without such a rigid division.83 Professor
Alan Wolfe suggests America's "civil religion"-a civil standard of
norms and generalized attitudes-resides in this penumbra between
private religions and the First Amendment's very public prohibition
against establishing a State religion.84 Intended to improve on the hard
dichotomy of the traditional public-private distinction, however, this
framework offers an ambiguous twilight zone wanting of clear
definitions.
Under the multidimensional view, X may be private in relation to Y
but public in relation to Z. 86 This view holds that the way we have
traditionally drawn the public-private distinction is incorrect. 87 Instead
we should be looking at the relationship between the parties." This
framework has the advantage of skirting complicated categorizations of,
for example, shopping malls.89 It can ignore the tricky issue of whether a
space is wholly private or a quasi-public zone where a privately owned
79. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 579 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("It
requires distortion to read 'person' as meaning one thing, then another within the same clause and
from clause to clause. It means, in my opinion, a substantial revision of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
80. Id.at 576-78.
81. See United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 334, 343-44 (2007).
82. Alan Wolfe, Public and Private in Theory and Practice: Some Implications of an
Uncertain Boundary, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON A

GRAND DICHOTOMY 182, 196 (Jeff Weintraub & Krishan Kumar eds., 1997).
83. Id.at 196-97.
84. Id.at 199 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. See id. at 196-98 (preferring "collective," "particularistic," and "ambiguous" norms to
absolutist public-private rules).
86. See generally Schoenhard, supra note 74 (raising difficulties with the traditional binary
way of looking at the public-private distinction and proposing a multi-dimensional approach).
87.

RAYMOND GEUSS, PUBLIC GOODS, PRIVATE GOODS 76, 103 (2001) (proposing not just

that the traditional liberal view is a mistake but also that it is part of the problem).
88. Schoenhard, supra note 74, at 658 ("[T]he three-dimensional perspective.., sorts public
and private characteristics in relational terms.").
89. Id. at 643-44. Schoenhard complains that the "application of the public-private distinction
has fallen into a state of troubling ad hocery." Id. at 642.
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it defaults to the
property is open to the public at large, because 90
relationships between the actors utilizing the property.
The traditional liberal democratic theory view is that governments
and corporations are public, and individuals are private. 9 1 As such, only
individuals are entitled to protections against the exercise of government
power under the Constitution.92 While corporations may not have existed
in the same way in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as they do
today, they share enough features of the governmental power structures
about which those thinkers were concerned.9 3 Like governments (and
unlike people), corporations are organizations created by people for
purely human purposes.94 Corporations have immortality (or at least no
natural death-they are not alive in the sense we use to describe natural
persons). 95 The composition of a corporation encompasses many
individuals (with the exception of one-person corporations which still
retain a multitude of roles-director, shareholder, executive-if not
people).9 6 Corporations also have no vote.97
90. Id. at 643-44.
91. Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate Managers
Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1021, 1028-29 (1996) [hereinafter Greenwood, Fictional
Shareholders];Gobetti, supra note 74, at 103. Gobetti explains:
We are indebted to early modem Natural Law theorists, British ones in particular, for
formulating a conception of the "citizen" as the holder of legal powers, and for giving us
the notion of harm as the criterion of distinction between private and public jurisdictionsthat is, between the "private" jurisdiction of the citizen/subject and the "public" jurisdiction
of the body that makes decisions for a politically unified group.
Gobetti, supra note 74, at 103 (footnote omitted); see also Note, The Corporation and the
Constitution: Economic Due Process and Corporate Speech, 90 YALE L.J. 1833, 1838 (1981)
[hereinafter The Corporation and the Constitution] (observing how traditional liberal democratic
theory makes "problematic the idea of corporate constitutional rights").
92. John Dewey, The Historic Background of CorporateLegal Personality,35 YALE L.J. 655,
656 (1926) (demonstrating that the fictional personhood of a corporation was more fiction than
person); see also Elizabeth Salisbury Warren, Note, The Case for Applying the Eighth Amendment
to Corporations,49 VAND. L. REV. 1313, 1333-34 (1996) (suggesting a wrinkle that corporations
may seek protection under the Constitution for private property rights but not for individual
liberties).
93. Greenwood, The Idolatry of Corporations,supra note 59.
94. See id.
95. See id. at n.24; see also Miller, supra note 57, at 910-911. Juggling fictional and natural
personhood metaphors can lead to confusion (and comedy), like one of Stephen Colbert's political
ad parodies during the 2012 Republican presidential primaries that argued: if corporations are
people and Mitt Romney carved up corporations for sale, then Mitt Romney is a serial killer. The
Colbert Report (Comedy Central television broadcast Jan. 15, 2012), available at
http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/405930/anuary- 15-2012/colbert-super-pacad---attack-in-b-minor-for-strings.
96. Greenwood, The Idolatry of Corporations,supra note 59, at n.24; Miller, supra note 57, at
910-11.
97. Greenwood, The Idolatry of Corporations,supranote 59, at n.24; Miller, supra note 57, at
910-11.
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If, for example, a corporation "speaks" during an election, it is clear
that its voice does not belong to those individuals who comprise the
corporation.98 The executives and marketing department are agents, and
if they speak, it is by setting aside their personal beliefs in order to serve
the corporation's interests. 99 Corporate speech is not merely group
speech; it is the speech of a power structure. 00 This structure is built to
secure its own interests, not the interests of an individual or group of
individuals l1 Unlike traditional groups which represent the views of
their members, a corporation is a fictional entity whose viewpoint has
been divorced from the individuals who are its component parts.102 The
corporate stance is to maximize profit.10 3 The views of the shareholders
and the directors they elect do not count.10 4 Moreover, a corporate
(group) viewpoint is, at best, redundant to the viewpoint of any one of its
members whose individual speech is already protected. 105 Natural
persons are individuals, not structures. Corporations and governments
are structures. The traditional democratic framework, motivated to
secure the rights of natural persons, would lump modem corporations
into the public sphere with governments.l°6
Applying different public-private distinctions changes how we look
at cases in two ways. First, it may change the way we think a court
should have decided the case.10 7 Second, it reveals issues of power and
inequality that may otherwise be hidden. 10 8 In cases like Lochner,

98. Greenwood, Essential Speech, supra note 13, at 1049.
99. Id. at 1038.
100. Id. at 1033-34.
101. Id.at 1033.
102. Id. at 1033-34. For further discussion about the distinction between corporations and
groups, see id. at 1029-48 (arguing that corporation speech is different than the group speech of,
e.g., the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People).
103. Id.at 1049.
104. See id. at 1035-36 ("Not only are the expressed views of the shareholders irrelevant, but
their actual interests are as well."). Directors have a fiduciary duty not to what the electing
shareholders want them to do but to the corporation itself. Id. at 1035.
105. See id. at 1038, 1056-57. As Professor Daniel Greenwood noted:
The actual speakers-the lobbyists, advertising copy writers, lawyers, executives, and
publicists who speak on behalf of the corporation-speak as agents, not on their own
behalf. That is, their roles demand that they set aside their personal views and act as
professionals, seeking the most effective means to promote their clients' views.
Id.at 1038.
106. See Goodman, supra note 74, at 1344, 1347; Greenwood, The Idolatry of Corporations,
supra note 59.
107. See Marijan Pav~nik, Legal Decisionmaking as a Responsible Intellectual Activity: A
Continental Point of View, 72 WASH. L. REv. 481,489 (1997) (discussing semantic frameworks in
relation to legal decisions).
108. See Baker, supra note 73, at 493-94; Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 205, 361 (1979) [hereinafter Kennedy, The Structure of

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 8

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:1027

framing the decision under the Santa Clara public-private view-as a
vindication of freedom from government interference with the putatively
free relationship between two private entities (employer and
employee)-radically alters the roles of the parties as opposed to a
traditional public-private view-as a defeat of employees' attempts to
secure protection against a structure of concentrated monopoly power
(corporations) imposing unfair terms on them with the assistance of state
coercive force.'° 9
III. HOW THE CURRENT SUPREME COURT
INTERPRETS THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DISTINCTION
Three recent Supreme Court decisions reveal the Court's
fundamental attitude towards corporate entities: Citizens United,110
FederalCommunications Commission v. AT&T,"' and Concepcion.112 In
these cases, the Court lumps corporate entities with natural persons on
the private side of the public-private split. 13 This approach is consistent
with the Santa Clara framework. 1 14 Corporations receive the same
protections against the government as individuals. 1 5 Flowing from these
decisions, cereal companies are lobbying to shelter advertisement speech
under the roof of the First Amendment. 116 Section A describes the
Blackstone's Commentaries] ("[U]nder cover of defining these rules, of settling alleged conflicts of
rights, the state has in fact authorized one of the parties to the dispute to dominate the other."
(emphasis omitted)).
109. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (finding that government regulation
violated a corporation's Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment); Morris R. Cohen, Property
andSovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8, 28-29 (1927); Kens, supra note 42, at 418 (2005) (looking at
the Court's concern for business interests during the Lochner era).
110. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
111. 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1182-83 (2011) (distinguishing between "person," which applies to
natural persons and corporations, and "personal," which only applies to natural persons (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
112. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011);
Jean Stemlight, Eliminating Class Actions-A Tsunami in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v.
2011,
(Sept.
19,
to
Justice,
SCOTUSBLOG
Threatens
Access
Concepcion
9:19 AM), http://www.scotusbiog.com/2011/09/eliminating-class-actions-%E2%80 %93-a-tsunamihow
the
(explaining
in-the-wake-of-att-mobility-v-concepcion-threatens-access-to-justice/
Concepcion decision diminished consumer power).
113. See FCC v. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1182-83; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (overruling
Austin and "retum[ing] to the principle established in Buckley and Bellotti that the Government may
not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity"); Miller, supra note
57, at 915; Stemlight, supra note 112.
114. See Goodman, supranote 74, at 1347 (arguing that the nature of a private enterprise to act
for itself distinguishes it from the public sphere).
115. See FCC v. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1182; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913; Goodman, supra
note 74, at 1344, 1347; Sternlight, supra note 112.
116. Redish, supranote 2, at 1,7.
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Supreme Court's constitutional approach to the protection of corporate
speech. Section B explains how the Supreme Court retained its principle
of corporate protectionism by delivering a narrow holding in FCC v.
AT&T. Section C investigates how the assumption that contracting
parties have equal bargaining power is consistent with the mistake in
Lochner. Finally, this Note frames the food industry's reaction to
proposed regulation in a public-private context in Section D.
A. PoliticalSpeech
In Citizens United, the Court expressly granted corporations
protection against the government for political speech. 1H7 Citizens United
is a descendant of Bellotti.'18 Perhaps it is Bellotti's prodigal son: it
granted more protections for corporations under the Constitution because
where Bellotti permitted some distinctions between corporate campaign
contributions and individual free speech, Citizens United did not
entertain such a notion. 1 9 When the Court flatly stated that corporations
should not be treated any differently than individuals under the First
Amendment, it was operating under the Santa Clara public-private
framework: corporations join individuals on one side and the
government remains on the other.12 ° The decision commits the same
error as the Lochner Court by concealing the disparity in power wielded
by individuals as opposed to corporations. 21

117. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
118. Id.
119. Compare First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) ("[Uinder the
circumstances of this case, we find 'no substantially relevant correlation between the governmental
interest asserted and the State's effort' to prohibit appellants from speaking." (quoting Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960))), with Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 ("No sufficient
governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit
corporations.").
120. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 ("The Court has thus rejected the argument that political
speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First
Amendment simply because such associations are not 'natural persons."'); Goodman, supra note 74,
at 1344, 1347 (arguing that the nature of private enterprise to act for itself distinguishes it from the
public sphere).
121. See Kens, supra note 42, at 418 (looking at the Court's concern for business interests
during the Lochner era); Floyd Abrams & Burt Neubome, Debating Citizens United, NATION, Jan.
31, 2011, at 19, 22 ("In the world the Supreme Court has built, the very rich enjoy massively
disproportionate political power. What's worse, the exercise of that power can now take place in
secret and can tap the almost unfathomable wealth available to our newly minted corporate cocitizens.").
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The Citizens United Court contrasted Bellotti with Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce,122 which it ultimately overruled. 123 It
claimed Austin conflicted with Bellotti.114 Bellotti held that legislators
125
cannot curb speech depending solely on the identity of the speaker.
Austin held that legislators can.'2 6 The Citizens United Court explained
that Austin looked at the potential for corporate speakers, who amassed
substantial wealth, to create an imbalance-that legislators may find a
"compelling governmental interest"' 127 to restrict speech that arises from
the prospectively "distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth
that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have
little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's
political ideas."' 128 The Court concluded that the antidistortion argument
in Austin reduced to a restriction based solely on identity. 29 But it was
more than0 mere identity: the Austin Court raised a concern that Bellotti
ignored.

13

Adding another layer of confusion, the Citizens United Courteven after expressly overruling Austin for restricting speech based on
identity-specifically looked at the identity of speakers.' 31 It looked at
the number of small corporations and how little wealth they had (and by
extension how little distorting they would produce). 32 If the issue is
solely about identity, analysis into the lack of distorting effects of speech
from small, not-so-wealthy corporations would be unnecessary. 33

122. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903; Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 655, 660 (1990) (holding that the government could invoke a compelling interest, such as the
distortion of speech created by concentrations of wealth, to restrict speech).
123. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 ("Austin is overruled, so it provides no basis for
allowing the Government to limit corporate independent expenditures.").
124. Id. at 903.
125. Id; First Nat'l Bank ofBos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978).
126. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903; Austin, 494 U.S. at 668-69.
127. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 ("[T]he Austin Court identified a new governmental
interest in limiting political speech: an antidistortion interest."); Austin, 494 U.S. at 666.
128. Austin, 494 U.S. at 660.
129. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 ("If the antidistortion rationale were to be accepted,
however, it would permit Government to ban political speech simply because the speaker is an
association that has taken on the corporate form.").
130. See Mayer, supra note 10, at 658 ("The corporate exercise of [F]irst [A]mendment rights
frustrates the individual's right to participate equally in democratic elections."). For further
discussion on the use of regulation as both a friend and enemy of freedom of speech, see FISS, supra
note 53.
131. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906-07.
132. Id. at 907 (demonstrating concern for "5.8 million for-profit corporations [that] filed 2006
tax retums... [m]ost of [which] are small corporations without large amounts of wealth").
133. See Abrams & Neuborne, supranote 121, at 22.
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Further, the Court worried about silencing the viewpoints of corporate
entities, forgetting that it is people who comprise these structurespeople who continue to receive protection under the First Amendment
and whose viewpoints may still be voiced.134 The Court coyly referred to
corporations as "associations of citizens," but conveniently overlooked
that the atoms of these associations-the citizens-already had
constitutional protection. 135 More significantly, the Court treated
corporations as 136any other group, such as unions, instead of as
fictional entities.

B. Implicit Protection
FCC v. AT&T narrowly held that the Freedom of Information Act
Exemption 7(C) ("FOIA Exemption 7(C)") only applied to natural
persons and not corporate entities.137 Implicitly, the narrow holding
allowed the Court to remain consistent with previous decisions that
upheld a corporation's right to protection against the government as if it
shared similar status to that of a natural person. 38 The Court's dictionary
treatment of the word "personal" allowed it to skirt the question of a
corporate entity seeking refuge from governmental power in a manner
similar to a person (the Santa Clarapublic-private framework). '9
AT&T notified the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
that it had overcharged the government for services to public schools as
part of the FCC's Education Rate program.14 AT&T provided numerous
documents in 14the course of the FCC's subsequent investigation into the
overcharging. ' AT&T settled, paid $500,000 to the government, and

134. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 907 ("By suppressing the speech of manifold corporations,
both for-profit and nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching
the public and advising voters on which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.").
135. Id. (characterizing Austin as allowing "Government to ban the political speech of millions
of associations of citizens").
136. Id. at 886; Greenwood, EssentialSpeech, supranote 13, at 1033.
137. See Fed. Commc'n Comm'n v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011).
138. See Greenwood, The Idolatry of Corporations,supra note 59 (arguing that the Court's
"ability to use the dictionary" ignored "the critical issue-why ordinary language should be
important in this alone of corporate rights cases").
139. See Goodman, supra note 74, at 1344, 1347; Greenwood, The Idolatry of Corporations,
supra note 59 ("[T]he opinion is grossly inadequate, as the briefest examination of the Court's
corporate jurisprudence makes clear. The Third Circuit was wrong, but it was not wrong because of
illiteracy.").
140. FCCv.AT&T, 131 S.Ct. at 1180.
141. Id.
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agreed to implement a new compliance plan. 142 A trade association later
submitted a Freedom of Information Act143 ("FOIA") request for the
documents used in the FCC's investigation.
Under FOJA Exemption 7(C), records are exempt that "could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy. ' 44 The FCC determined that several documents were exempt in
regards to the personal privacy of the individuals named in the
documents but not for the company itself.145 AT&T argued that because
the Administrative Procedure Act defined corporations as persons, then
personal privacy must refer to the privacy of any person, including
corporations. 146 Chief Justice John Roberts carefully argued the scope of
the word "personal" without ever challenging the notion of whether
corporate persons ought to receive protection from government power as
natural persons do. 14 7 He preserved the broader doctrine of corporate
constitutional protectionism by addressing only the narrower statutory
analysis of the meaning of "personal."'' 48 Citing dictionaries, Chief
Justice Roberts dryly compared "personal" and "person" with "corny"
and "corn" and "cranky" and "crank.' ' 149 Because "corny" and "cranky"
held little relation to the corn plant or the "crooked angular shape from
which a 'crank' takes its name," Justice Roberts confidently stepped foot
on solid legal ground to declare that "personal" was yet another adjective
its
corresponding
meaning
from
distinct
bearing
a50
noun form.'
151
Chief Justice Roberts continued his ordinary language analysis.
like "personal tragedy" and "personal
"Personal privacy,"
52
correspondence," refer to natural persons not corporations, he said.'
The use of "personal" meant the opposite of "business-related."' 153 He
spent the remainder of the decision comparing the construction of FOIA

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
note 59.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. AT&T did not admit liability. Id.
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2006).
FCCv. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1180-81.
Id.at 1181.
Id. at 1182.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Greenwood, The Idolatry of Corporations,supra
FCC v. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1181-82 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id at 1182-83 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1182.
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Exemption 7(C) with that of Exemptions 4 and 6. 114 Although the Court
ultimately held that personal privacy did not extend to corporations such
as AT&T, it limited the scope of the decision strictly to FOIA
Exemption 7(C). 155 Chief Justice Roberts explicitly reserved
constitutional privacy from this holding (and thus preserved the Santa
Claradoctrine) when he wrote that FCC v. AT&T "does not call upon us
to pass on the scope of a corporation's 'privacy' interests as a matter of
constitutional or common law. The discrete question before us is instead
whether Congress used the term 'personal privacy' to refer to the privacy
of artificial persons in FOIA Exemption 7(C).' 5 6
C. Burden-Shifting and BargainingPower
In Concepcion, the Concepcions filed a claim against AT&T for a
consumer dispute. 157 They subsequently joined a class action. 158 AT&T
responded by invoking the class action waiver in its contract with the
Concepcions, which called for a mandatory arbitration hearing. 5 9 The
Concepcions sought protection under California law which prohibited
unconscionable agreements. 160 By finding that state arbitration waiver
161
clauses were invalid under the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA"),
Concepcion shifted the burden of risk of adhesion contracts onto
individual consumers. 162 Again, this is a Lochnerian mistake where the

154. Id.at 1184-85.
155. Id. at 1185.
156. Id, at 1184.
157. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011); Marcia Coyle,
Divided Justices Back Mandatory Arbitration for Consumer Complaints, 245 N.Y. L.J., Apr. 28,
2011, at 2.
158. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1744; Coyle, supra note 157, at 2.
159. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744-45; Coyle, supranote 157, at 2.
160. Concepcion, 131 S,Ct. at 1745. In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia described the
California unconscionability test:
[When the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which
disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages,
and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of
money, then . . .the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party "from
responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another."
Under these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and
should not be enforced.
Id at 1746 (alterations in original) (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110
(Cal. 2005) (citation omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. See id. at 1748, 1751 (arguing that the efficiency interests of arbitration controlled).
162. Sternlight, supranote 112.
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power and lived
Court assumed contracting parties had equal 1 bargaining
63
on the same side of the public-private divide.
Justice Antonin Scalia focused the majority decision on corporate
incentives and non-interference. 64 All consumer contracts are adhesive,
he held, which meant consumers faced no barrier when invoking the
California unconscionability test. 165 Allowing consumers to consolidate
their claims under class action suits created a disincentive for
corporations to deal with consumers individually.166 Justice Scalia
assumed consumers would not necessarily want class action suits (or
their attendant benefits, including helping consumers "who do not know
67 Instead, they would "remain free" to bring
they have been wronged").
168
individual claims.
The Concepcion Court summoned efficiency factors as to why class
arbitrations were inconsistent with the FAA. 169 Class arbitrations are
more expensive, time-consuming, complicated (procedurally, especially
with regard to class certification), and they add difficulties such as
confidentiality and absent parties. 170 The Court, however, emphasized
these efficiency factors with regard to corporate defendants, rather than
individual people. 171 In fact, the Court ultimately believed it was doing
the Concepcions a favor because bilateral (non-class) arbitration would
72
allow a swifter resolution and, if successful, recovery of damages. 1
163. See GREENFIELD, supra note 15, at 33; Goodman, supra note 74, at 1344, 1347; Kens,
supra note 42, at 418.
164. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1750.
165. Id. at 1746, 1750.
166. Id. at 1750.
167. Id.; Stemlight, supra note 112 (noting that arbitration clauses "like AT&T's, which
eliminate class actions, cannot help consumers or employees who do not know they have been
wronged. Class actions, in contrast, allow a single knowledgeable victim to bring a lawsuit on behalf
of those similarly situated").
168. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1750. But see id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Where does
the majority get its contrary idea-that individual, rather than class, arbitration is a 'fundamental
attribut[e]' of arbitration? The majority does not explain." (quoting id. at 1748 (majority opinion))).
169. Id.at 1750-51.
170. Id. But see id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The majority compares the complexity of
class arbitration with that of bilateral arbitration. . . .But, if incentives are at issue, the relevant
comparison is not 'arbitration with arbitration' but a comparison between class arbitration and
judicial class actions.").
171. Id.at 1752 (majority opinion) ("[C]lass arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants.");
Cliff Palefsky, Separate and Unequal, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 14, 2011, 12:57 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/separate-and-unequal/ (hereinafter Palefsky, Separate and
Unequal) ("[The Court] shockingly expressed concern for the unfairness to corporate defendants of
having to be bound by an incorrect result while inflicting that unfairness on consumers and
employees without any concern whatsoever."). But see Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1758 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the guarantee of procedural advantages of arbitration was not the only
motive of Congress in drafting the FAA).
172. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1753 (majority opinion) ("[T]he Concepcions were better off
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Justice Stephen Breyer's dissent looked at Congress's intent in
passing the FAA.173 Arbitration was relatively new at the time, and
Congress envisioned disputes between merchants where the issue was
more industry custom than legal in nature.1 74 These disputes would
feature parties possessing "roughly equivalent bargaining power" as
opposed to a dispute between company and customer.175 Moreover, the
majority's efficiency concerns were misguided. 176 Justice Scalia
compared the complexity of class arbitrations to non-class arbitrations
rather than class arbitrations to in-court class actions.'

77

Justice Scalia's

clumsy attempt to argue that the Concepcions were "better off' with
bilateral arbitration derived from the same confusion about this
comparison. 178 Class arbitrations may take advantage of the efficiencies
of the arbitration process that would yield less time and expense than a
corresponding in-court class action. 179 Additionally, one class arbitration
would be more efficient than the time and180cost to resolve "thousands of
separate proceedings for identical claims.''
Disallowing class actions by mandating non-class arbitrations
wildly shifts the economic burden onto consumers who, by the very
nature of adhesion contracts, have no bargaining power.' 8 ' Consumers
with claims for small dollar amounts may desert rather than file their
actions, succumbing to an unwillingness to deal with the hassle of
litigation instead of pursuing otherwise meritorious claims. 82 Justice
Breyer asked rhetorically, "What rational lawyer would have signed on
to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees
stemming from a $30.22 claim?"' 83
under their arbitration agreement with AT&T than they would have been as participants in a class
action, which 'could take months, if not years, and which may merely yield... recovery of a small
percentage of a few dollars."' (quoting Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cvI 167 DMS (AJB),
2008 WL 5216255 at *12 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008))).
173. Id. at 1757-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
174. Id.at 1759.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1753 (majority opinion); id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Cliff Palefsky,
Closing Thoughts on the Arbitration Symposium, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 26, 2011, 6:41 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/closing-thoughts-on-the-arbitration-symposium/
(hereinafter
Palefsky, Closing Thoughts) ("My sense is that the elimination of class actions is not merely a
possible result of the [Concepcion] decision; rather, it was pretty clearly the goal of the majority.").
179. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1759-61.
180. Id. at 1759.
181. See Stemlight, supra note 112.
182. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1760 ("In general agreements that forbid the consolidation of
claims can lead small-dollar claimants to abandon their claims rather than to litigate."); Coyle, supra
note 157, at 2; see Palefsky, Separate and Unequal, supranote 171.
183. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer quoted Carnegie v.
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What Concepcion did was look at corporations and individuals as
existing on the same side of the public-private divide. 184 They were
contracting parties with equal bargaining power. 185 The Court acted to
protect corporations and their interests in arbitration hearings against a
state actor, California in this instance. 186 Protection against government
power in this manner is wholly consistent with the Santa Clara
on
framework and also Lochner's mistake: corporations and individuals
187
government.
the
out
keep
to
wire
barbed
one side of the fence, with
D. Breakfast of Champions
Consisting of members of several government agencies, including
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Food and Drug
Administration, the Interagency Working Group on Food Marketed to
Children ("IWG") published a guide proposing self-regulatory principles
for the advertising of food to children.1 18 The IWG solicited feedback on
its proposal, including thirty questions-the last of which inquired
89
whether enacting such principles infringed on First Amendment rights. 1
General Mills, maker of Trix, Lucky Charms, and Fruit Roll-ups, 190
commissioned a white paper by Professor Martin Redish which
Redish
thumped the First Amendment drum in response. 191 Professor 192
cited several Supreme Court cases protecting commercial speech.
HouseholdInternational,Inc., "The realisticalternative to a class action is not 17 million individual
suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30." Id. (quoting 376 F.3d
656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
185. Palefsky, Closing Thoughts, supra note 178 ("[T]he last mechanism of fairness protection,
state unconscionability doctrine, got shot when it stood in between the Court and its target.").
186. See id.; Palefsky, Separate and Unequal, supranote 171.
187. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text; Palefsky, Closing Thoughts, supra note
178; Palefsky, Separate and Unequal, supra note 171.
188. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON FOOD MARKETED TO CHILDREN, PRELIMINARY
PROPOSED NUTRITION PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATORY EFFORTS, available at

http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/04/110428foodmarketproposedguide.pdf.
189. Id. at 24.
190. Brands, GENERAL MILLS, http://www.generalmills.com/en/Brands.aspx
Nov. 5,2012).
191. Redish, supra note 2, at 1 n.1.

(last visited

192. Id. at 8; see GROCERY MFRS. ASS'N, COMMENT OF T14E GROCERY MANUFACTURERS
ASSOCIATION ON INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON FOOD MARKETED TO CHILDREN: GENERAL
COMMENTS AND PROPOSED MARKETING DEFINITION: FTC PROJECT No. P094513, available at

(arguing
http://www.gmaonline.org/file-manager/HealthNutrition/GMA general comment.pdf
along similar lines as Professor Redish); see also Letter from Carter Keithley, President, Toy Indus.
Ass'n, Inc., to Fed. Trade Comm'n (July 14, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
foodmarketedchildren/07840-80008.pdf (arguing not only that restrictions on advertising will
violate the First Amendment but also that the 1WG's proposal would have implications beyond the
food industry into the toy industry).
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In its report, the IWG stressed two principles: that the food industry
should "encourage children, through advertising and marketing, to
choose foods" that make up a healthy diet and to reduce "consumption of
foods with significant amounts of nutrients that could have a negative
impact on health or weight."'1 93 It called these principles "basic nutrition
principles."' 94 The IWG asked the industry to apply these principles to
those foods "most heavily marketed to children, such as breakfast
cereals., 195 The IWG's recommendation for self-regulatory standards
was not unique. 196 As recently as 2008, the FTC reported on the
nutritional value of foods marketed to children and adolescents. 197 The
purpose of the latest report was to persuade the industry to advertise
unhealthy foods
less or to reformulate or repackage those foods
98
accordingly.
The issue about sugary cereals and children's health crossed into
pop culture when artist and culture-jammer Ron English snuck altered
cereal boxes onto the shelves of a Ralph's supermarket. 99 English
changed Kellogg's Frosted Flakes, whose Tony the Tiger mascot boasts,
"They're Gr-r-reat!" to Killkidds' Sugar Frosted Fat, whose obese tiger
mascot retorts, "They're Gr-r-rooooss!,, 200 He converted General Mills's
Lucky Charms to General Propaganda's Yucky Children Charmer,
boasting that it was "a good source of cavities" and nutrition free. 2'
English announced in January 2012 that he would produce an obese
vinyl figure parody of Tony the Tiger. 20 2 These counter-advertising
193.

INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON FOOD MARKETED TO CHILDREN, supra note 188, at 3

(mentioning "sodium, saturated fat, trans fat, and added sugars" as among those nutrients which
have a "negative impact on health").
194. Id.
195. Id. (including "carbonated beverages, restaurant foods and snack foods" on that list as
well).
196. Id. at4.
197. See generally FED. TRADE COMM'N, MARKETING FOOD TO CHILDREN AND
ADOLESCENTS: A REVIEW OF INDUSTRY EXPENDITURES, ACTIVITIES, AND SELF-REGULATION

(2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/07/P064504foodmktingreport.pdf
198.

INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON FOOD MARKETED TO CHILDREN, supra note 188, at

5-6.
199. Nara Ramanujan, Cereal Boxes: Note From a Fan, RON ENGLISH'S POPAGANDA (Oct. 14,
2011), https://www.popaganda.com/news/cereal-boxes-note-fan; Short Shelf Life: At a Ralph's in
Venice, RON ENGLISH'S POPAGANDA (Oct. 11, 2011), https://www.popaganda.com/news/short-

shelf-life-ralphs-venice [hereinafter Short Shelf Life].
200.

Compare Short Shelf Life, supra note

199, with KELLOGG'S FROSTED FLAKES,

http://www.frostedflakes.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2012).
201. Compare Short Shelf Life, supra note 199, with Brands, GENERAL MILLS: LUCKY
CHARMS, http://www.generalmills.com/Brands/Cereals/LuckyCharms.aspx (last visited Nov. 5,
2012).
202.

Fat Tony Vinyl Figure: Coming Soon!, RON ENGLISH'S POPAGANDA (Jan. 18, 2012),

https://www.popaganda.com/news/fat-tony-vinyl-figure-coming-soon.
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pieces tend toward the extreme,
but call attention to cereal nutrition that
20 3
normal advertising does not.
Professor Redish's opposition view to the IWG squarely fits the
Santa Clara framework where corporations are on the opposite side of
the public-private distinction from governments. 204 He made no
distinction amongst political advocacy, artistic productions, and
commercial advertisements. 205 He complained that the proposed
reductions on advertising certain foods to children constitute a violation
of the First Amendment.20 6 In this instance, he claimed they infringe on
the First Amendment's protection of commercial speech.20 7
Strangely, Professor Redish linked the 1WG's call for selfregulation with an implicit government threat to suppress speech.20 8
Never mind that the IWG report was a request for comments and not a
piece of actionable legislation. 20 9 There was no government restriction
on speech in the IWG report. 21 0 Nevertheless, Professor Redish
portrayed the food industry in the position of seeking protection under
the Constitution against the government's implied regulatory threat. 2"
The speaker is the corporation advertising to, among others, children.2 2

203. Nick Carbone, Tony the Tubby Tiger: An Artist's Warning Against Sugary Cereal, TIME
(Jan. 24, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/01/24/tony-the-tubby-tiger-an-artists-wamingagainst-sugary-cereals/.
204. See Goodman, supra note 74, at 1344, 1347 (arguing that the nature of private enterprise
to act for itself distinguishes it from the public sphere); Redish, supra note 2, at 7.
205. See Redish, supra note 2, at 7.
206. Id
207. Id. But see Abrams & Neuborne, supra note 121, at 22 ("[T]he Supreme Court has upheld
bans on... harmful advertising.").
208. See Redish, supra note 2, at 4-5 ("[G]overnment cannot be permitted to establish a
regulatory framework, the sole intent and effect ofwhich will be to suppress speech .... ").
209. See id. at 5-6 ("The voluntary nature of the regulations is therefore appropriately deemed
to be nothing more than a precursor to coercive enforcement in the event that the industry fails to
comply."); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Interagency Working Group's Preliminary Proposed
NutritionPrinciplesto Guide Industry Self-Regulatory Efforts: ConstitutionalIssues, in COMMENTS
A, at 28, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
OF VIACOM INC. app.
foodmarketedchildren/07884-80045.pdf (arguing that the IWG's principles "inherently carry with
them the implicit threat that failure to comply on a 'voluntary' basis will result in government
stepping in to enforce them or otherwise induce compliance with them"). See generally
INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON FOOD MARKETED TO CHILDREN, supranote 188.
210.

See generally INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON FOOD MARKETED TO CHILDREN, supra

note 188 (proposing principles in advertising by showing preference to healthier foods).
211. Redish, supra note 2, at 5-6. Professor Redish spends a good portion of his paper
discussing why nutritional guidelines and product advertising have no impact on childhood obesity
while ignoring the sources cited in the IWG report. Id. at 13-19. But see INTERAGENCY WORKING
GRP. ON FOOD MARKETED TO CHILDREN, supra note 188, at 3-4 (listing several sources linking
advertising impact and nutrition).
212. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON FOOD MARKETED TO CHILDREN, supra note 188, at 7 &
nn. 14-16; Redish, supra note 2, at 3.
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Professor Redish's argument takes its force from its unstated premise:
helpless, powerless, fragile speech from one private entity to another
should be protected from public power, because only in the absence of
rules will the truth prevail.2 13
IV.

RECONSIDERING RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND
PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO MOTIVATE A SOLUTION

Applying the traditional liberal democratic framework of the
public-private distinction to the cases and legislation in Part III yields a
deeper analysis of power structures.2 14 Under the traditional liberal
democratic framework, corporations should not receive protection under
the First or Fourteenth Amendments.215 They are not private persons
with liberty rights but power structures from which citizens may need
216
Individuals, not power structures, receive protection
protection.
against power structures. 217 Sections A-C revisit the Supreme Court
cases examined in Part III and apply the traditional liberal democratic
framework analysis. Section D calls for an adoption of the traditional
liberal democratic view of the public-private distinction and explains
how it would affect the legislation discussion from Part III.
A.

Citizens United Redux

In Citizens United, the Supreme Court granted corporations First
Amendment protection.1 8 A court employing the traditional liberal
democratic framework, however, would reach the opposite holding.219
Putting corporations on the proper side of the divide with government
reinforces the motivation behind the First Amendment to secure
protection for the speech of individuals. 22 0 A corporation speaks on

213. See Redish, supra note 2, at 12-13 (describing the steps used by the Supreme Court to
"determine whether commercial speech could constitutionally be regulated or suppressed").
214. See Baker, supra note 73, at 493-94; Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's
Commentaries,supranote 108, at 361.
215. See Greenwood, Essential Speech, supra note 13, at 1007 (arguing not only that the Court
has erred in granting constitutional protection to corporate speech but also that there has been a lack
of discussion from the Court on the matter).
216. See id. at 1007-08.
217. See Miller, supra note 57, at 891; supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
218. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 900 (2010).
219. See The Corporation and the Constitution, supra note 91, at 1834, 1856-57 (proposing a
test regarding whether or not granting First Amendment protection "serve[s] speech interests").
220. See Abrams & Neubome, supra note 121, at 22 ("[N]on-economic constitutional
rights.., flow from respect for human dignity. Robots have no souls. Neither do business
corporations. Vesting either with free speech rights is legal fiction run amok.").
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behalf of its fictional shareholders.22 t Corporate speech does not reflect
the plurality of voices of the executives and employees who work on its
behalf.222 Their viewpoints remain their own. 22 3 Even the director's

viewpoints remain their own.224 The corporate viewpoint is simply the
maximization of the profit interests of its fictional shareholders.225 Thus,
it is not free speech at all, but compelled speech.226 This type of speech
targets regulation so that the corporation can earn more profit, exert
more influence, remove more profit-restraining rules, and so on.227 This
is exactly the type of power-an entity created by citizens limiting the
ability of those citizens to self-govern-from which Locke and Rousseau
sought to protect the citizenry.22 8
The Citizens United Court leaned on Bellotti.229 Recall the Bellotti
Court's theme that the source of the speech did not determine whether or
not the Constitution protected what was said.23 ° Corporations, the Court
reasoned, contribute ideas, discussion, and information just as natural
persons do.23' Since the Constitution protects the speech of natural
232
persons, it should equally protect the speech of corporate entities.
Corporate speech, the Court shrugged, may affect democratic elections,
but the Constitution protects both effective and ineffective speech.233
221. Shareholders are not determinate people with roots in a community and a finite window
for retirement but are a fiction-like the corporation itself--concocted as a completely abstract
notion. See Greenwood, FictionalShareholders,supra note 91, at 1096. For a much more thorough
discussion of this topic, see generally id.
222. Greenwood, EssentialSpeech, supra note 13, at 1049.
223. Id. at 1038.
224. Id. at 1052-53. If the directors acted on their own behalf instead of the corporations', they
would be violating their fiduciary duty. Id. at 1035.
225. Id. at 1049.
226. Id. at 1055.
227. Id.; see also Abrams & Neubome, supra note 121, at 23 ("Citizens United insists that
unrestricted, massive corporate electioneering is really good for us.").
228. See LOCKE,supra note 19, at §§ 3-4; ROUSSEAU, supra note 19, at 141; see also THOMAS
I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 682 (1970) ("The broader the goals of the
association, the larger its membership, the more impersonal the relations of its members to each
other, the more compulsion there is to join, then the more similar the private government becomes to
public government.").
229. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899-900 (2010) (discussing the
holding in Bellotti).
230. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) ("We thus find no support
in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions of this Court, for the proposition that
speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection
simply because its source is a corporation .. ");see Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 900 (citing
Bellotti on this very point).
231. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783 ("[C]orporations ...afford[] the public access to discussion,
debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas.").
232. Id.at 784.
233. Id.at 790 ("To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome of the vote; this
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This is where the Citizens United Court muddied the waters with a
confusing shift from discussing democracy and people to the identity of
the speaker.23 4 The Court first explained the intent of the First
Amendment, which was entirely consistent with traditional liberal
democratic theory: "Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for
it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people. 23 5 Two
paragraphs later, the Court obscured the conception of corporate speech
by invoking caution when speech restrictions censor one speaker but not
another.2 36 Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote, "Speech restrictions based
on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control
content. ,,237 From the control of the influence of officials, the Court
steered the conversation to control of content; from "hold[ing] officials
accountable to the people"-protecting the speech of the people-the
Court turned to protecting the speech of the speaker. 8 This rhetorical
flourish allowed the Court to hammer home the Bellotti holding that
First Amendment protection extends to speakers, no matter the source.239
The Court began with a traditional democratic theory framework under
which the government protects people against sources of power but
ended up with the strictly Santa Clara framework in which corporations
(potential sources of power) are lumped in with natural persons by virtue
of the government protecting the speech of all speakers. 4 ° Pulling the
traditional democratic theory thread through the whole case would knit a
different world in which natural persons would receive constitutional
armor against all concentrations of power, both governmental and
corporate. 24' This interpretation also preserves the Court's concern for
the identity of the speaker, except it limits the scope of "speaker" to
natural persons. 42

would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to
suppress it ....).
234. Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 ("Speech is an essential mechanism of
democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people."), with id.
at 899 ("Speech
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control
content.").
235. Id. at 898.
236. Id. at 898-99.
237. Id. at 899.
238.

Compare id. at 898, with id.at 899.

239. Id.at 900 (discussing the Bellotti holding as it relates to political speech).
240. Compare id.
at 898, with id.
at 899.
241.
1028.

Gobetti, supra note 74, at 103; Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders, supra note 91, at

242. See Greenwood, FictionalShareholders,supra note 91, at 1027-28.
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B. FCC v. AT&T Redux
The reason corporations do not have personal privacy is not because
of how we define the word in the context of FOIA, but because they do
not have liberty rights under the traditional liberal democratic view.243
Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. AT&T jibes with the
liberal democratic approach but does so through a much different
reasoning than in the Court's holding. 2 While it is true that an ordinary
language analysis of FOIA Exemption 7(C) did not read corporations as
persons having personal privacy, it is also true that the Court's scrutiny
did not venture into constitutional privacy.2 45 Determining whether
artificial persons get the same or similar rights as natural persons should
hinge on a broader policy than what is printed in the dictionary.2 46 The
liberal democratic paradigm is a stronger theory of corporate rights than
the statutory analysis given by the Court.247 It encompasses both how we
view corporate rights under the Constitution as well as the smaller FOIA
Exemption 7(C) issue.248
AT&T did not seek privacy protection under FOIA because it
valued freedom from government intrusion. 249 Remember that it
voluntarily handed over the same documents to the FCC during the
latter's investigation. 250 To the contrary, AT&T sought personal privacy
refuge from FOIA because it wanted to protect its informational market
advantage from its competitors represented by the trade association
making the FOIA request.2 5 1 Essentially, AT&T sought protection from
competition. It is difficult to see how such protection benefits anyone
other than AT&T.253 AT&T provided a service, via a government
program, to a public school.254 Liberal democratic principles dictate that
such services fall under public scrutiny, particularly after AT&T settled

243. Greenwood, The Idolatry of Corporations, supra note 59 (looking at the Court's
reluctance to address the foundational reasons why a corporation should have neither personal
privacy nor personhood).
244. Id.
245. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011).
246. See Greenwood, The Idolatry of Corporations,supra note 59.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. FCCv. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1180.
251. Greenwood, The Idolatry of Corporations,supranote 59.
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. FCCv. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1180.
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a recent government investigation. 5 Intelligent public discourse, not the
dictionary, requires access to AT&T's documents.256
C. Concepcion Redux
Any public-private view of Concepcion other than the one the Court
25 7
applied reveals a stark shifting of litigious burden onto individuals.
The Court erred by assuming that corporations and individuals have
equal bargaining power.258 This Lochnerian mistake, where the Court
assumed contracting parties lived on the same side of the public-private
divide, fixes itself if future courts recognize the similarity in power
between corporations and governments.2 5 9 The consequences of failing
to adopt the traditional liberal democratic framework here are decidedly
pro-corporate and anti-individual. 60
The Concepcion holding gave corporations permission to add class
arbitration waivers to their boilerplate adhesion contracts as if
corporation and individual were bargaining equally for fair
consideration.2 6 I This violated the intent of arbitration to begin with.262
The FAA intended arbitration to be "a matter of consent, not
coercion. ' ' 263 Since adhesion contracts, by their nature, do not permit
negotiable input from the consumer side, arbitration is no longer

255. Greenwood, The Idolatry of Corporations,supra note 59.
256. Id.
257. Sternlight, supra note 112.
258. See Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 2001) (providing a test that courts
look to such that unequal bargaining power created both procedural and substantive
unconscionability). But see Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and
Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower, 41 MD. L.
REv. 563, 624-25 (1982) (claiming that the doctrine of unequal bargaining power is impotent
without looking at the paternalism of the State).
259. See GREENFIELD, supra note 15, at 34; Goodman, supra note 74, at 1344, 1347; Kens,
supra note 42, at 417-18.
260. See Myriam Gilles, AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion: From Unconscionability to
Vindication of Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 15, 2011, 4:25 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2011 09/att-mobility-vs-concepcion-from-unconscionability-to-vindication-of-rights/;
Palefsky,
Closing Thoughts, supra note 178; Palefsky, Separateand Unequal, supranote 171.
261. See Gilles, supra note 260 ("[T]he [Concepcion] ruling is the real game-changer for class
action litigation, as it permits most of the companies that touch consumers' day-to-day lives to place
themselves beyond the reach of aggregate litigation by simply incorporating class waiver language
into their standard-form contracts.").
262. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. ofTrs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,479
(1989); Palefsky, Separate and Unequal, supra note 171.
263. Volt, 489 U.S. at 479 ("Arbitration under the Act is a matter of consent, not coercion, and
parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit."); Palefsky,
Separate and Unequal, supra note 171 ("Arbitration was always intended to be a voluntary
process.
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voluntary but mandatory. 264 Eliminating class arbitration coerces
consumers into bilateral arbitration. 265 By favoring corporations in this
manner, the Court "has opened the door to every permutation of abusive
and unfair arbitration process. 26 6 The Court has essentially invited
corporations to draft mandatory bilateral arbitration clauses into their
adhesion contracts and exercise full control over the resolution
process.267
Under Concepcion, not only is a consumer less likely to bring a
small-dollar claim against the corporation with which he or she signed
an adhesion contract, but consumers who would have been alerted to the
cause of action brought on behalf of others "similarly situated" but
otherwise unaware that they may have been wronged will remain in the
dark, their harm left unsatisfied. 268 This type of ignorance is easily
resolved by understanding the disparity between individuals and
corporations and realizing that individuals are limited with regard to the
amount of information they need to effectuate legal action. 69 The burden
on individuals is a heavy one: knowledge, time, and ability. 270 As
defendants in these cases, of course, a corporation typically does not
have the equivalent problem of joining its corporate brethren in a class
action suit against a lone customer.
All of the aforementioned shifting of the burdens onto natural
persons makes sense ifthe accepted context is that corporations and
natural persons are both private, because privately contracting parties
each negotiate for their own interests. 27' The burden-shifting makes less
sense, however, if corporations are on the public side because of the

264.

Palefsky, Separate and Unequal, supra note 171 ("Real consent was always intended to

be the only check and balance necessary to ensure fairness and to keep these matters out of the
courts.").

265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Gilles, supra note 260; Palefsky, Separate and Unequal, supra note 171. Palefsky
explained:
As a fundamental concept, you can't turn an adversarial system over to one side and
invite it to design and control the process. It is thus no surprise that the abuses are getting
all the attention and all of the positive attributes of voluntary [alternative dispute
resolution] processes are lost in the noise.
Id.
268. Sternlight, supra note 112 ("[M]any victims will simply not realize they have been
harmed, much less harmed in a violation of a law.").
269. Id. ("[M]ost of us lack the time or ability to figure out that we are being victimized by
fraud, discrimination, negligence, or other misdeeds.").
270. Id. ("Indeed, even victims of larger or clearer wrongs may lack the knowledge or
wherewithal to file claims, whether in litigation or arbitration.").
271. See id.
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impetus to protect individuals from coercive bargaining.272 Parties, after
all, waive constitutional rights when agreeing to arbitrate, and a natural
person (as consumer) is the only party waiving these rights if
corporations are on the public (protector) not the private (protectee)
side. 273 The California law under dispute in Concepcion was, in fact, a
protection for consumers against unconscionable arbitration agreements
and properly recognized corporations for what they were: entities against
which protection for natural persons was needed.274
D. A New Callfor an Old Framework
The Supreme Court and legislators should adopt the traditional
liberal democratic view of the public-private distinction.2 7 5 Consistency
and clarity require it. Many municipalities are corporations, yet courts
routinely hold that they may not infringe on the speech of natural
persons and that they have no speech rights themselves against the states
that incorporated them.276 The liberal democratic framework, which
groups corporations and governments together on the public side, is
more consistent with the republican views that shaped the
Constitution. 277 Like governments, corporations are structures that have
little in common with natural persons.278 To take seriously the political

272. See Palefsky, Separateand Unequal, supranote 171.
273. See id Palefsky explained:
An agreement to arbitrate involves the waiver of several constitutional rights: the First
Amendment right of petition, the Fifth Amendment right to due process and the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial. And to be sure, there are numerous statutes that
expressly provide for the right of access to a federal court, which is obligated to follow
the law. But incredibly, the Supreme Court has never acknowledged the waiver of
constitutional rights inherent in an agreement to arbitrate and has never specifically
considered the constitutionally required standard for such a waiver.
Id. This is significant because, as a statute, the FAA cannot waive constitutional rights. Id.
Furthermore, arbitrators and arbitration panels are not necessarily bound by Supreme Court
precedent. Id.
274. Id.
275. See also Dibadj, supra note 4, at 729 (suggesting a constitutional amendment explicitly
precluding corporations from constitutional protection).
276. See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552-53 (1975) (holding that a city
municipal board's refusal to allow the production of a play violated the First Amendment).
277. See Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders, supra note 91, at 1028-29 (arguing that
corporations "belong closer to the governmental side, as elaborate human creations, meant to
promote human happiness but potentially taking on a life and mission of their own"); The
Corporationand the Constitution, supra note 91, at 1857 (providing an example of a "democratic
town meeting" where selling time to speak would be inconsistent with democratic principles).
278. See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
("The State need not permit its own creation to consume it."); ROUSSEAU, supranote 19, at 148.
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legacy running from Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau through the
Constitution requires pursuit of their common goal: safeguarding the
rights of citizens.279
The criticism of the FTC's proposed guidelines to advertisers of
children's cereal focuses on violations of the corporations' First
Amendment rights.280 Since corporations do not have First Amendment
rights under the liberal democratic framework, the force of their
criticism evaporates. 281 The food industry wanting to insulate itself from
government interference is, like AT&T in FCC v. AT&T, for its own
benefit and nothing more.282 The resistance to legislation, like AT&T's
resistance to the FOIA request by invoking FOIA Exemption 7(C), is an
attempt to bypass the marketplace forces that would occur if consumers
had more complete access to information.28 3 Like the mandatory bilateral
arbitration clauses soon to flood the cell phone industry as a result of
Concepcion, consumers would be left with a "take it or leave it" choice
with their cereal.284 Instead of voting with their dollars in a marketplace
guided by regulation designed to encourage healthier breakfast choices,
consumers would be forced to accept the products given to them-not
because they were successful in the marketplace but because the industry
was immune from it. 285 In asking for protection under the First
Amendment for its advertising speech, the food industry is in effect
asking to regulate itself-to act as a government would. 286 It is asking to
spend corporate money to bypass government regulation and act
according to its own self-regulating impulses. 287 This behavior does not
stimulate industrial growth or innovation, but merely aims to retain the
status quo. 288 Free advertising speech is itself a limit on consumers'
access to information. 289 The goal is for the industry to remove itself
279. See, e.g., Dibadj, supra note 4, at 729-30.
280. Redish, supra note 2, at 1.
281. Greenwood, FictionalShareholders,supra note 91, at 1028; see The Corporationand the
Constitution, supra note 91, at 1838 (explaining the difficulty in finding a balance between the
"extent the defense of private rights should restrain the legislature from seeking whatever degree of
social equality is necessary to allow less powerful members of society actually to enjoy the benefits
of those same private rights").
282. See supra Part IV.B.
283. See Fiss, supra note 53, at 57 (discussing "the public's right to be properly informed
about issues of public importance"); supra Part IV.B.
284. See supraPart V.C.
285. See supra Part V.C.
286. See Greenwood, EssentialSpeech, supra note 13, at 1062.
287. See id. at 1055.
288. See Greenwood, The Idolatry of Corporations,supra note 59.
289. Notice also that the content of advertising is not the view of any particular person but
rather speech written by an agent for the corporation. See Greenwood, Essential Speech, supra note
13, at 1038.
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from the market by limiting information that might cause consumers to
make alternative purchases or alternative choices.290 Just as government
officials may not use their department budgets for their reelection
campaign, corporations ought not to use their net profits to amplify their
rights. 291 Corporations are a government-like power against which the
Constitution affords natural citizens protection.292 The food industry's
strategy to shield itself under the First Amendment is wise given the
current corporate rights doctrine the Supreme Court has adopted, but
examination within the liberal democratic framework reveals the move
to be nothing more than an artificial entity utilizing its profits to change
the regulatory environment in order to make more profits.29 3 The profit
does not come without two costs. The first is the health of citizens,
which the IWG believed to be at stake when it issued its report. 29 The
second cost is to democracy, since an artificial entity's ability to dodge
regulation necessarily means a corresponding
decrease in the ability of
295
natural persons to govern themselves.
Grouping corporations and governments together better preserves
democratic values.2 96 Corporations, like governments, exercise
disproportionate power as opposed to natural persons.297 Their actions
affect the lives of multitudes of individuals.29 8 They wield influence
through an immense store of wealth, compelled to act in such a way to
remove regulation to maximize their profits and continue a cycle of
growing influence. 299 The same cannot be said of the inverse. 3 00 The

290. See id. at 1055.
291. See id. at 1062.
292. See id. at 1063.
293. See id. at 1062 ("[T]he more a corporation is permitted to modify the law to allow it to
profit-maximize at the expense of others, the more money it will have with which to pursue more
such modifications.").
294.

INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON FOOD MARKETED TO CHILDREN, supranote 188, at 1.

295. See Greenwood, Essential Speech, supra note 13, at 1062 ("Permitting the fiction to
manipulate the legal system reduces the likelihood that the citizenry will be able to self-govern.").
296.

See EMERSON, supra note 228, at 682; ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS

RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 39 (1948) ("The constitutional status of a merchant advertising
his wares, of a paid lobbyist fighting for the advantage of his client, is utterly different from that of a
citizen who is planning for the general welfare."); Note, Free Speech, the Private Employee, and
State Constitutions, 91 YALE L. 522, 540 (1982) ("As a business begins to acquire more
characteristics of a corporate bureaucracy and fewer of a family enterprise, however, the employer's
interest in privacy diminishes proportionally.").
297. See Kens, supranote 42, at 417-18.
298. See Abrams & Neubome, supra note 121, at 22 ("In the world the Supreme Court has
built, the very rich enjoy massively disproportionate political power.").
299. Greenwood, Essential Speech, supranote 13, at 1055.
300. See Abrams & Neuborne, supra note 121, at 22.
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strength of the traditional liberal democratic framework is not simply
that it once influenced the Constitution, but that it still speaks today in
the way it envisioned a society coping with large power structures,
whether we call them governments or modem corporations.30 '
The danger of eschewing conceptual progress and retaining the
current, regressive framework is the failure of our justice system to
protect the rights of natural citizens. °2 Civilizations are judged "by the
quality of their civil justice systems, ' 3 °3 and which framework we adopt
determines that quality. 3° 4 The proper viewpoint that best clarifies the
current relationships between the empowered and those wearing the
yoke is the traditional liberal democratic framework. 0 5 Without this, the
inconsistency is jarring: corporations have government-like powers yet
we protect them as if they were individuals.30 6 Citizens will get lost in
the shuffle if judges and legislators enforce corporate protectionism to
the point that individual rights are subject to "secret corporate
tribunals. 30 7 Even so, George Orwell's vision of the future may yet be
prophetic: "If there was hope, it must lie in the proles, because only
there... could the force to destroy the Party ever be
generated .... Until they become conscious they will never'' rebel,
and
8
until after they have rebelled they cannot become conscious.

301. See LOCKE, supra note 19, at §§ 3-4; ROUSSEAU, supra note 19, at 141; Paul Brest, State
Action andLiberalTheory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1330
(1982).
302. Palefsky, Closing Thoughts, supra note 178 ("It is important that judges, academics, and
lawyers of conscience ... continue to speak up for the fundamental constitutional right of American
citizens to access [the] public justice system ... .
303. Id
304. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
305. See Palefsky, Closing Thoughts, supra note 178.
306. See Goodman, supra note 74, at 1344, 1347; Greenwood, EssentialSpeech, supra note 13,
at 1062.
307. Palefsky, Closing Thoughts, supra note 178 ("We can no longer lecture the world on the
'rule of law' when American citizens don't have the right to have the laws passed for their
protection enforced correctly and are instead relegated to secret corporate tribunals with no right of
appeal."); see also Sternlight, supra note 112 ("We should not allow companies to shortcut the
legislative process by using arbitration to abolish class actions.").
308. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 61-62 (Plume 1983) (1949). In the cacophonous din of what
passes for contemporary journalism, consciousness may be a tall order: "The citizen of Oceania is
not allowed to know anything of the tenets of the other two philosophies, but he is taught to execrate
them as barbarous outrages upon morality and common sense. Actually, the three philosophies are
barely distinguishable." Id. at 174-75.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The Constitution did not spring from a virgin birth. It had parents. It
descended from a group of thinkers including Hobbes, Locke, and
Rousseau. 30 9 This Note encourages legislators and judges not to ignore
the Constitution's family tree.3 10 Legislators and the Supreme Court
should craft their respective legislation and decisions regarding
constitutional protections for corporations under the lens of the liberal
democratic public-private framework. 31 ' Doing so ensures consistency
with traditional liberal democratic theory and better preserves the
democratic values that shaped our Constitution.
David Gerardi*

309. Mayer, supranote 10, at 578.
310. See supratext accompanying notes 275-79.
311. See supra Part IV.D.
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